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Responding to a 911 call about a suspicious 鈥渂lack male,鈥� police officers confronted Pastor Michael Jennings while he was watering flowers in his neighbors鈥� yard. The police invoked Alabama鈥檚 stop-and-question law, appearing in Alabama Code 搂 15-5-30, which allows the police to stop people they reasonably suspect of criminal activity and ask them their name, address, and an explanation of their actions. Jennings said he was 鈥淧astor Jennings,鈥� he lived across the street, and his neighbors had asked him to water their flowers while they were away. Nevertheless, the police demanded physical identification and arrested Jennings after he refused to provide it.

Pastor Jennings sued the arresting officers and city in federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The Eleventh Circuit has already held, in Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230 (11th Cir. 2023), that Alabama鈥檚 stop-and-question law
nowhere authorizes straying beyond oral questioning into document demands. Applying that precedent, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Pastor Jennings鈥� case 鈥渇alls within the purview of Edger,鈥� and that the officers 鈥渓acked even arguable probable cause鈥� to arrest him because he orally provided the information required by the stop-and-question law, and because the statute created 鈥渘o legal obligation to provide his ID.鈥�

On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, the district court certified a question that, in effect, asks the Alabama Supreme Court whether it agrees with the Eleventh Circuit鈥檚 holdings. Our amicus brief urges the Alabama Supreme Court to agree with the Eleventh Circuit for two main reasons.

First, as the Eleventh Circuit held in Edger, Alabama鈥檚 stop-and-question law plainly does not authorize demands for documents. The statutory title references only stopping and 鈥渜uestioning鈥�; the text is consistent with that limitation; and, unlike other Alabama laws, the stop-and-question law nowhere requires anyone to present any form of identification.

Second, even if the stop-and-question law were ambiguous, two rules of statutory construction would require construing it to rule out demands for documents. One is the rule of lenity, which provides that courts do not construe laws to create criminal liability by implication. The other is a rule that courts construe laws to avoid constitutional conflict. Here, the stop-and-question law should not be construed to contain an implicit, unclear obligation to present physical ID because that construction would render the law: (1) unconstitutionally vague, in violation of due process; (2) unconstitutionally broader than its title, in violation of section 45 of the Alabama Constitution; and (3) subject to challenge under the search-and-seizure and self-incrimination protections of the U.S. and Alabama Constitutions